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Introduction
It has been known for some time that shutting down ("privatizing") a pay-as-you-go social security system would simply reallocate resources between generations when all economic variables are deterministic and labor supply is inelastic. In particular, no new resources would be created in present value once the "winners" have fully compensated the "losers." 1 Allowing for elastic labor supply as well as various risks that are difficult to insure in the private market, however, changes things considerably.
With elastic labor supply, privatization could produce large efficiency gains by reducing the effective tax rate on labor supply, even if the government's set of policy instruments is second best (Smetters, 2005) . Social Security's payroll taxes distort labor supply decisions because the program redistributes resources both across and within generations.
Across generations, Social Security benefits are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with taxes on younger workers. When the economy grows slower than the interest rate (i.e., is dynamically efficient), workers with average earnings receive less than one dollar in present value in future benefits for each dollar they contribute. This loss services the implicit debt inherited from past generations who received more from Social Security than they paid.
Within generations, the U.S. Social Security system is progressive by giving a household with a lower average index of monthly wages (AIME) a larger Social Security benefit relative to their AIME (i.e., a higher "replacement rate"). Contributions by households with higher-than average lifetime earnings are effectively used to subsidize the contributions by households with lower-than average lifetime earnings. This redistribution increases effective marginal tax rates on households with AIME's above the economy-wide average while reducing effective marginal tax rates on households with smaller AIME's.
The U.S. Social Security system also provides two sources of risk sharing that could be reduced by privatization. First, the progressive benefit formula shares wage shocks among participants that are difficult to insure in the private market. Privatization could reduce this insurance unless it were complemented with some form of redistribution. Second, Social Security pays benefits until the beneficiary and spouse die rather than over a fixed number of 1 See, e.g., Breyer (1989) , Feldstein (1995) , Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998), Murphy and Welch (1998) , Mariger (1999) , Shiller (1999) , and Diamond and Orszag (2003) .
years. To the extent that longevity uncertainty is also difficult to insure privately, privatization could also reduce annuity protection.
Overview of Our Approach. Determining the overall change in efficiency from privatization requires simulation analysis. We use a heterogeneous overlapping-generations model in which agents with elastic labor supply face idiosyncratic earnings shocks and longevity uncertainty. The economy's entire transition path after privatization is calculated, allowing us to determine the efficiency gain or loss from this reform. 2 All households across generations and income classes receive rebates or are taxed by exactly enough to return their expected remaining lifetime utility to their pre-reform levels. Privatization produces an efficiency gain if the net amount of new resources remaining after these rebates and taxes is positive, and produces an efficiency loss if negative. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) , new net resources (positive or negative) are distributed to future households in equal amounts (growth adjusted over time).
In our particular policy experiment, we consider a stylized partial privatization where households immediately begin to redirect 50 percent of their payroll tax into private accounts.
Traditional Social Security benefits are reduced slowly across cohorts and eventually reach 50 percent of their original scheduled value for the youngest workers alive at the time of reform. Cash flow deficits, therefore, emerge during the transition which are financed with a consumption tax; Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) used a deterministic model to show that consumption tax financing of the transition creates fewer distortions to labor supply and capital accumulation than income or wage tax financing. 3 Summary of Our Findings. We find that partial privatization can substantially improve labor supply incentives. When wage shocks are assumed to be insurable in the private market, our stylized partial privatization produces new net resources equal to $21,900 per future 2 The insurance value of pay-as-you-go Social Security has also been investigated byİmrohoroglu,İmro-horoglu, and Joines (1995) and Conesa and Krueger (1999) .İmrohoroglu et al. focus on steady states and find that the value of risk sharing is outweighed by the reduction in capital. Conesa and Krueger consider whether a majority of the population would support privatization. Our analysis finds that while privatization typically raises long-run welfare it often fails to increase efficiency due to larger losses to transitional generations. 3 Nishiyama and Smetters (2004) show that a consumption tax, though, might be less efficient than a progressive income tax in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. Still, using a proportional increase in the income tax, as examined in KSW, would not overturn our key results.
household in our benchmark model. However, when, more realistically, wages are not insurable, privatization reduces efficiency by about $5,600 per future household despite improving labor supply incentives. This loss occurs even though privatization substantially increases the welfare of those born in the long run by increasing the capital stock.
The efficiency loss that we calculate when wages are not insurable makes three key assumptions appear at first to be biased against privatization. Several surprising insights emerge as we investigate these assumptions more closely.
First, our benchmark economy is closed to international capital flows. As a result, capital accumulation after privatization reduces interest rates, discouraging more accumulation. If, instead, capital could flow across borders then more capital could be accumulated with no reduction in the rate of return to saving.
We find that the efficiency losses are actually larger (equal to about $6,600 per future household) in a small open economy version of our model that allows for perfect international capital flows. To be sure, privatization leads to substantially more capital accumulation in this case. For the purpose of determining efficiency gains, however, the higher interest rate in the open economy also means that it is more costly to borrow against the long-run gains from privatization in order to compensate households alive during the transition that would otherwise lose from privatization. This finding emphasizes the fact that gains to macroeconomic variables alone are not necessarily good metrics for inferring efficiency gains. Second, our benchmark calculations assume that a private annuity market does not exist, and so the pre-reform Social Security system not only provides insurance against wage uncertainty but against longevity as well. Households must guard against outliving their resources after privatization by relying more on precautionary saving. Whereas insurance efficiently shares idiosyncratic shocks that are uncorrelated across households, precautionary saving instead tries to self-insure against living "too long" using a capital buffer, which is less effective at smoothing consumption across states.
Rather surprisingly, we find that allowing for an actuarially-fair private annuity market also increases efficiency losses (about $7,200 per future household). This result can be traced to several factors including the relative larger amount of precautionary saving after privatization when private annuity markets do not exist. The smaller interest rate in this case lowers the cost at which compensation can be made across generations. More savings and labor supply also expand the tax bases, thereby reducing the income tax rates that are required to fund the rest of government.
Third, our benchmark partial privatization does not explicitly include any mechanism that shares idiosyncratic wage shocks that were previously partially insured under Social Security. Since private markets generally do not exist for insuring wages, households must again rely on more precautionary saving, which is less efficient than insurance.
We also simulate privatization where the government matches contributions made by poorer households; the match is financed by increasing general-revenue income taxes proportionally. This match is permanent across time but phased out linearly across income classes so that a household with median income receives no match. A match equal to 10 percent of income at a low level of income is indeed effective at reducing the efficiency loss to about $4,400 per future household, but a 20-percent match actually increases the loss to $9,900. This non-monotonic behavior is due to the trade-off between risk sharing and labor supply distortions: some match is beneficial but is dominated by distortions at higher tax rates. In fact, there is no match rate that allows privatization to produced efficiency gains; alternative designs of contribution matching performed even worse.
Finally, we show that simply increasing the progressivity of the smaller Social Security program that remains after partial privatization performs quite well at restoring risk sharing and can even lead to overall efficiency gains after privatization (about $2,700 per future household). Compared to contribution matching, this alternative produces smaller marginal tax rates because Social Security benefits are computed based on lifetime earnings whereas the match is based on contemporaneous earnings.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 explains the calibration of the model, Section 4 results from various privatization simulations, and Section 5 concludes the paper. The Appendices explain the computational algorithm in more detail and contain various calibration information.
Model
Our model has three sectors: heterogeneous households with elastic labor supply; a competitive representative firm with constant-returns-to-scale production technology; and a government with a full commitment technology. Like most previous analyses of Social Security reform, our model's pre-reform neoclassical economy is stationary by construction, and so we don't capture the effects of projected demographic changes. 4 We, however, are only interested in comparing the efficiency of gains from privatization against the baseline, not examining the implications of demographics. We used a similar model in Nishiyama and Smetters (2004) to analyze potential reforms of the federal income tax; the model in the current paper adds a Social Security system which requires an additional state variable in order to track a household's historical average earnings.
The Household Sector
Households are heterogeneous with respect to the following variables: age, i; working ability, e i (measured by their hourly wages); beginning-of-period wealth holdings, a i ; and, average historical earnings, b i , that determine their Social Security benefits. Each year, a large number (normalized to unity) of new households of age 20 enter the economy. Population grows at a constant rate, ν. A household of age i observes an idiosyncratic working ability shock, e i , at the beginning of each year and chooses its optimal consumption c i , working hours h i , and end-of-period wealth holding a i+1 , taking as given the government's policy schedule and future factor prices. 5 At the end of each year, a fraction of households die according to standard mortality rates; no one lives beyond age 109. For simplicity, all households represent two-earner married couples of the same age.
Let s i denote the state of an age i household, 4 We are aware of only a few papers, including De Nardi,İmrohoroglu and Sargent (1999), Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001) , and Nishiyama (2004) , that attempt to capture the effect of non-stationary demographics on baseline factor prices. 5 Because there are no aggregate shocks in the present model, households can perfectly foresee these factor prices and policy variables, using the current distribution of households and the current policy variables. Yet, their own future working ability and mortality are uncertain.
where i ∈ I = {20, ..., 109} is the household's age, e i ∈ E = [e min , e max ] is its working ability (the hourly wage), a i ∈ A = [a min , a max ] is its beginning-of-period wealth, and
is its average historical earnings for Social Security purposes. 6 Let S t denote the state of the economy at the beginning of year t,
, where x t (s i ) is the joint distribution of households where s i ∈ I × E × A × B. W LS,t is the beginning-of-period net wealth held by the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA), which as described below, is used to determine the efficiency gain or loss from privatization.
W G,t is the net wealth of the rest of the government.
Let Ψ t denote the government policy schedule known at the beginning of year t,
where C G,s is government consumption, τ I,s (.) is an income tax function, τ P,s (.) is a payroll tax function for Social Security (OASDI), τ C,s is a consumption tax rate, tr SS,s (s i ) is a Social Security benefit function, and tr LS,s (s i ) is an LSRA wealth redistribution function.
The specifications of these functions are described below.
subject to
where the utility function, u i (.), takes the Cobb-Douglas form nested within a time-separable 6 The average historical earnings are used to calculate the Social Security benefits of each household. The variable bi approximates the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) multiplied by 12 as of age i.
isoelastic specification,
γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; n i is the number of dependent children at the parents' age i; ζ is the "adult equivalency scale" that converts the consumption by children into their adult equivalent amounts; and, h max i is the maximum working hours.
The constant β is the rate of time preference; φ i is the survival rate at the end of age i; w t is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor (accordingly, w t e i h i is total labor compensation at age i in time t); and, r t is the rate of return to capital. a min i+1,t (s i ) is the state-contingent minimum level of end-of-period wealth that is sustainable, that is, even if the household receives the worst possible shocks in future working abilities. 7 At the beginning of the next period, the state of this household when private annuity markets do not exist becomes
where q t denotes accidental bequests that a household receives at the end of the period. In the presence of perfect annuity markets, the household's state in the next period is instead
7 In particular, a min i+1,t (s i ) is allowed to be negative but cannot exceed in magnitude the present value of the worst possible future labor income stream at maximum working hours. Although not shown explicitly in equation (2) in order to save on notation, any borrowing (i.e., ai+1 < 0) by an agent age i at time t must be done at rate r t /φ i in order cover the chance that they will die before repaying their loan.
The average historical earnings b i follows Let 1 [a=y] be an indicator function that returns 1 if a = y and 0 if a = y. Then, the law of motion of the measure of households is
where π i,i+1 denotes the transition probability of working ability from age i to age i + 1.
The aggregate value of accidental bequests each period is deterministic in our model because all risks are idiosyncratic and uncorrelated across households. Accidental bequests could be simply distributed equally and deterministically across all surviving households, as in some other papers. That approach suffers from two shortcomings. First, households would anticipate receiving a bequest with certainty, thereby artificially crowding out their pre-bequest savings. This savings reduction would be mitigated if bequests were random.
Second, empirically, the inequality of bequests is important in generating a realistic measure of wealth inequality.
Our alternative strategy distributes bequests randomly to surviving working-age households. Each household receives a bequest q t with constant probability η:
where q t is the average wealth left by deceased households and η is the ratio of deceased household to the surviving working-age households.
Government
Government tax revenue consists of federal income tax T I,t , payroll tax for Social Security (OASDI) T P,t , and consumption tax T C,t . These revenues are
Social Security (OASDI) benefit expenditure T r SS,t is
The law of motion of the government wealth (normalized by productivity growth and population growth) is
where C G,t is government consumption.
Measuring Efficiency Gains
We follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) by measuring efficiency gains from Social Security privatization using a Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority that compensates households who would otherwise lose from reform. 9 To be clear, the LSRA is not being proposed as an actual government institution that attempts to produce Pareto-improving policy changes. Instead, it is simply a hypothetical mechanism that allows us to measure the standard Hicksian efficiency gains in general equilibrium associated with privatization.
To see how the LSRA works, suppose that a new policy is announced at the beginning of period 1. First, the LSRA makes a lump-sum compensating variation transfer or tax,
to each living household of age i to return its expected remaining lifetime utility at state s i to its pre-reform level in the baseline (pre-reform) economy. Next, the LSRA makes a lump-sum transfer or tax, tr CV,t (s 20 ), to each future household (born in periods 2, 3, ...) to make it as well off as in the baseline economy, conditional on its initial state at age 20. Thus far, the net present value of these taxes and transfers across living and future households will generally not sum to zero. So, finally, the LSRA makes an additional lumpsum transfer (tax), ∆tr, to each future household so that the net present value across all transfers is zero. For illustrative purposes, we assume, like Auerbach and Kotlikoff, that these additional transfers are uniform across future generations on a growth-adjusted basis.
The lump-sum transfers made by the LSRA, therefore, are
If ∆tr > 0 then privatization has produced net new resources and so we say that this reform "increases efficiency." Conversely, if ∆tr < 0 then privatization "reduces efficiency."
The aggregate net lump-sum transfers / taxes to living households at time t, T r LS,t , is
9 We, however, extend the Auerbach and Kotlikoff approach to a heterogeneous-agent environment.
and the law of motion of the LSRA wealth (normalized by productivity growth and population growth) is
Aggregation and Production
National wealth W t is the sum of total private wealth, government net wealth W G,t , and LSRA net wealth W LS,t , and total labor supply L t is measured in efficiency units:
In a closed economy, capital stock is equal to national wealth, that is, K t = W t , and gross national product Y t is determined by a constant-returns-to-scale production function,
The profit-maximizing condition for this competitive firm is
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
In a small open economy, factor prices, r * t and w * t are fixed at international levels, and domestic capital stock K D,t and labor supply L t are determined so that the firm's profit maximizing condition satisfies
Gross domestic product Y D,t is determined by the production function,
and gross national product Y t is determined by
Net foreign investment is shown by the difference between national wealth and domestic capital stock, that is, W t − K D,t .
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Definition Recursive Competitive Equilibrium:
be the state of the economy, and let Ψ t be the government policy schedule known at the beginning of year t,
A series of factor prices {r s , w s } ∞ s=t , accidental bequests {q s } ∞ s=t , the policy variables
s=t , the parameters of policy functions {ϕ s } ∞ s=t , the value function of households {v (s i , S s ; Ψ s )} ∞ s=t , the decision rule of households
and the measure of households {x s (s i )} ∞ s=t , are in a recursive competitive equilibrium if, in every period s = t, ..., ∞, each household solves the utility maximization problem (1)- (6) taking Ψ t as given; the firm solves its profit maximization problem, the capital and labor market conditions (16)- (21) clear, and the government policy schedule satisfies (13)- (15) .
In steady-state,
for all t and s i ∈ I × E × A × B. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the model's key parameters, as discussed below. 1 The capital-GDP ratio is targeted to be 2.74 (r = 6.25 percent) without annuity markets.
Calibration
2 The average annual working hours are 3414 per married couple when h max = 8760.
3 In a heterogeneous-agent economy, the ratio of income tax revenue to GDP is 0.123. 4 The OASDI budget is assumed to be balanced. 
Households
Utility Function Parameters. The coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, is assumed to be 2.0. The number of dependent children at the parents' age i, n i , is calculated using the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) as shown in Table 3 . The "adult equivalency scale," ζ, is set at 0.6. 10 As discussed later, β is chosen to hit a target capital-output ratio, We adjusted the salaries in the numerator by adding imputed payroll taxes paid by their employers, which allows us to levy the entire payroll tax on employees in order to incorporate the payroll tax ceiling. The max operator in the denominator adjusts the hourly wage for a small fraction of households in the SCF with large reported salaries but few reported working hours such as the self-employed. Table 4 shows the eight discrete levels of working abilities of five-year age cohorts. We use a shape-preserving cubic spline interpolation between each five-year age cohort to obtain 10 Hence, a married couple with two dependent children must consume about 52 percent (i.e., 2 0.6 = 1.517) more than a married couple with no children to attain the same level of utility, ceteris paribus. 11 The 95th and 99th percentiles of the working hours per married couple of aged 20-64 in the 2001 SCF are 5,280 and 6,375, respectively. 12 According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the average hourly earnings of production workers have increased by 3. the working ability for each age cohort. 13 In the version of our model where we "turn off" the idiosyncratic wage shocks, the hourly wages of the representative household are assumed to be those of the 40-60th percentile households. 
Production
Capital and Private Wealth. Capital K is the sum of private fixed assets and government fixed assets. In 2000, private fixed assets were $21,165 billion, government fixed assets were $5,743 billion, and the public held about $3,410 billion of government debt. 14 Government net wealth is set equal to 9.5 percent of total private wealth in the initial steady-state economy.
The time preference parameter β is chosen in each variant of our model explored below so that the capital-GDP ratio in the initial steady state economy is 2.74, the empirical value in 2000. 15 Production Technology. Production takes the Cobb-Douglas form,
where, recall, L t is the sum of working hours in efficiency units. The capital share of output is given by
The value of θ in 2000 was 0.30. 16 The annual per-capita growth rate µ is assumed to be 1.8 percent, the average rate between 1869 to 1996 (Barro, 1997). Total factor productivity A is set at 0.949, which normalizes the wage (per efficient labor unit) to unity.
The Depreciation Rate of Fixed Capital. The depreciation rate of fixed capital δ is chosen by the following steady-state condition,
In 2000, private gross fixed investment accounted for 17.2 percent of GDP, and government (federal and state) gross investment accounted for 3.3 percent of GDP. 17 With a capitaloutput ratio of 2.74, the ratio of gross investment to fixed capital is 7.5 percent. Subtracting productivity and population growth rates, the annual depreciation rate is 4.7 percent. holds to itemize deductions when it is more valuable to do so, and we assume that the value of the itemized deduction increases linearly in the Adjusted Gross Income. 18 The additional exemption per dependent person is $2,900 where the number of dependent children is consistent with Table 3 . Table 5 shows the statutory marginal tax rates before EGTRRA. 19 As noted earlier, a household's labor income in this calibration includes the imputed payroll tax paid by its employer. Thus, taxable income is obtained by subtracting the employer portion of payroll tax from labor income.
The Government
The standard deduction, the personal exemption, and all tax brackets grow with productivity over time so that there is no real bracket creep; this indexing is also needed for the initial economy to be in steady state. Also, since the effective tax rate on capital income is reduced by investment tax incentives, accelerated depreciation and other factors (Auerbach, 1996), the tax function is further adjusted so that the cross-sectional average tax rate 
2.9
Note: The payroll tax adjustment factor ϕ P equals 1.0 in. the baseline economy.
on capital income is about 25 percent lower than the average tax on labor income. 20 In 2000, the ratio of total individual federal income tax revenue (not including Social Security and Medicare taxes) to GDP was 0.102 and the ratio of corporate income tax to GDP was 0.021. Each statutory federal income tax rate shown in Table 5 Table 6 .) Social Security benefits are based on each worker's Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), b i /12, and the replacement rate schedule in the United States. The replacement rates are 90 percent for the first $561, 32 percent for amounts between $561 and $3,381, and 15 percent for amounts above $3,381. Social Security, therefore, is progressive in that a worker's benefit relative to AIME (the "replacement rate") is decreasing in the AIME.
The U.S. OASDI also pays spousal, survivors' and disability benefits in addition to the standard retirement benefit described above. Indeed, retiree benefits accounted for only 69.1 percent of total OASDI benefits in December 2000. 21 OASDI benefits are adjusted upward by the proportional adjustment factor ϕ SS so that total benefit payments equal total payroll tax revenue. The adjustment factor ϕ SS equals about 1.39 in our model with wage shocks and 1.23 in our model without wage shocks. This adjustment proportionally distributes nonretiree OASDI payments across retirees.
Policy Experiments
We simulate a stylized phased-in partial privatization of Social Security that begins in year 1. Workers immediately start redirecting 50 percent of their payroll tax payments into private saving accounts. As is implicit in most previous work on privatization, assets in the new private accounts are assumed to be perfect substitutes with other private assets, including earning the same market rate of return and being subject to the same income tax schedule, as outlined above. As a result, the new private accounts do not have to be explicitly modeled; the redirected payroll simply increases regular household saving.
Social Security benefits are reduced linearly over time. Households age 66 and older in year 1 receive the current-law (baseline) benefits throughout the rest of their lifetime; households of age 65 in year 1 receive benefits that are 1.25 percent lower than the current- 21 See Table 5 .A1 in Social Security Administration (2001). law level throughout the rest of lifetime; households of age 64 in year 1 receive benefits 2.5 percent lower than the current law-level, and so on. Households age 25 or younger in year 1 receive one half of their traditional Social Security benefits when they turn 65.
Since benefit payments are reduced more slowly than payroll taxes during the transitional period, Social Security faces a cash-flow deficit that we finance with a consumption tax; work by Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001) also focused on consumption tax financing as a method of producing the largest macroeconomic gains from privatization. Since changes to the Social Security system will also influence the size of the capital stock and, hence, non-Social Security government receipts, the rest of the government budget is balanced by proportional changes in marginal income tax rates.
We first consider the representative-agent economy without wage shocks (equivalently, with insurable wage shocks) where all households have the wage profile of the 40-60th percentile in Table 4 , i.e., lifetime income group e 3 . We then turn to a heterogeneous-agent economy with uninsurable wage shocks. We initially assume that both economies are closed to international capital flows and that a private annuity market does not exist.
Representative-Agent Economy without Wage Shocks
As shown in Run 1 in Table 8 , partial privatization of Social Security in the representativeagent economy increases national wealth by 20.7 percent in the long run compared to the baseline economy. GNP increases by 9.3 percent in the long run, while labor supply increases by 4.8 percent. These large gains are driven by pre-funding a portion of Social Security's liabilities that were previously financed on a pay-as-you-go (unfunded) basis.
Moreover, national wealth and GNP increase throughout the entire transition path. Labor supply initially increases by 3.4 percent in the first year as households reoptimize their lifecycle choices after the policy change. Then, it declines slightly between years 1 and 20 after the reform before eventually increasing. The reason for this non-monotonic behavior is two-fold. First, as shown in Table 8 , labor supply increases faster than capital during part of the first decade after reform, briefly decreasing the wage rate by about 1 percent. Second, the new temporary consumption tax, which starts at 6.5 percent and comes down over time as Social Security benefits are gradually reduced, discourages labor supply during the transition. 22 Despite these positive gains to economic variables, not everyone wins from privatization.
As shown for Run 1 in Table 9 These losses are mainly caused by the transitional consumption tax, which especially harms middle-aged households that hold a large amount of non-Social Security wealth. 23 In a closed economy, these households are also hurt by the fall in the interest rate shown in Table 8 . 24 Future households, who pay very little of the transition costs gain substantially from privatization. For example, newborns in Year 1 gain about $24,600 per couple while generations born 20 years later gain about $47,100. These gains arise mainly from higher wages and from the reduced distortions from payroll taxes. Federal income taxes also decline by 21.2 percent in the long run due to an expanded economy. 22 The consumption tax does not return exactly to zero in the long run due to a larger labor supply interacting with the progressive benefit schedule within the smaller Social Security system that remains after privatization.
23 Social Security wealth under law and in our model is protected by inflation, including that caused by consumption taxes. 24 For example, the welfare loss of a 40-year old is reduced by half in a small open economy (not shown), where the interest rate does not change. Does privatization actually produce overall efficiency gains, that is, after the "winners" compensate the "losers?" To make this determination, we simulate the same experiment but with an operative Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA). 25 Recall that the LSRA transfers exactly enough wealth to would-be losing households alive at the time of the reform so that their remaining expected lifetime utilities return to their pre-reform levels. These transfers must be financed with borrowing that is financed with the gains to future generations. All net new resources (positive or negative) are then distributed equally to future households (growth adjusted over time). As shown in Table 9 , privatization produces about $21,900 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars) in additional net resources per each future household that enters the economy in year 2 and later. In other words, the 50-percent phased-in privatization does indeed increase efficiency in our deterministic economy setting.
Heterogeneous-Agent Economy with Wage Shocks
Run 2 in Table 8 shows the effects of the same stylized privatization experiment in a more realistic economy with uninsurable wage shocks. Unlike in the deterministic economy, Social Security's progressive benefit formula now provides some risk sharing that is unattainable in the private market. National wealth now increases by 18.7 percent in the long run, but by less than in the representative-agent economy (Run 1) because a portion of private saving is now for precautionary motives, which is less sensitive to changes in Social Security policy.
Labor supply increases by 3.5 percent in the long run and GNP is 7.8 percent higher.
Similar to the representative-agent economy, most households alive at the time of the reform are worse off because they have to pay higher taxes to finance the transition. Run 2 in Table 9 shows that relatively high wage (and, hence, wealthier) households tend to be hit the hardest by the consumption tax. sharply with the gain of $21,900 in the deterministic economy discussed above.
Alternative Experiments in the Heterogeneous-Agent Economy
In a Small Open Economy. Run 3 shows the effect of privatization in the setting of a small open economy where any changes in the capital-labor ratio are nullified immediately by international capital flows. Since interest rates do not decline, national wealth increases by more than in the closed economy setting. The increase in labor supply is also smaller since the wage rate does not rise. Table 10 shows that GNP increases gradually and by 11.5 percent in the long run. Table 11 shows that the welfare losses of households alive at the time of the reform tend to be smaller relative to the closed economy (Run 2, efficiency loss than in the closed economy. This hunch is incorrect. When the LSRA is operative, Table 11 shows that the efficiency losses are actually slightly larger in the small open economy, equal to $6,600 per each future household. The reason is that the LSRA's cost of borrowing is higher in the small open economy setting since the interest rate does not decrease over time.
Perfect Annuity Markets. Thus far, we have assumed private annuity markets do not exist and so, in addition to sharing wage uncertainty, the Social Security system shares longevity uncertainty in a way the private market cannot. It would appear at first glance that privatization has a better chance of producing efficiency gains if we instead assumed that a private annuity market is available. This intuition also turns out to be incorrect.
Run 4 in Table 11 shows that the efficiency losses are actually larger with perfect private annuity markets than without (Run 2). In particular, each household loses $7,200, compared to $5,600 shown earlier (Run 2, Table 9 ) without an annuity market. As shown for Run 2 in Table 8 , privatization without a private annuity market leads to a 18.7 percent increase in national wealth in the long run, which is larger than the 14.4 percent increase for Run 4
shown in Table 10 . The reason is that households increase their precautionary savings in Run 2 as the annuity insurance provided by Social Security is reduced; in contrast, households can rely more on the private annuity market rather than precautionary savings in Run 4. The smaller amount of precautionary savings in Run 4 produces larger efficiency losses for three reasons: (i) the LSRA must borrow at a higher interest rate; (ii) income taxes are higher since there is less capital and labor income; and (iii) the interest elasticity of saving is higher, increasing the role that falling interest rates have on discouraging additional saving.
Contribution Matching. The pre-reform Social Security system is progressive by giving households with a lower average index of pre-retirement wages a larger Social Security benefit relative to their pre-retirement wages, that is, a higher "replacement rate." To be sure, the privatized experiment considered above preserves some progressivity by reducing benefits proportionally only by half in the long run-the poor still get a larger replacement rate.
Yet, a proportional reduction in benefits still reduces progressivity; for example, reducing all benefits by 100 percent would eliminate progressivity.
Run 5 considers privatization with a progressive contribution match. In particular, working households with low levels of labor income receive a fairly generous match equal to 10 percent of their earnings. This matching rate declines linearly to zero as labor income approaches $60,000, which is slightly above the median household income in the model economy. 26 While ensuing Social Security deficits continue to be financed with a consumption tax, the contribution match is financed each year by increasing the marginal income tax rates proportionally across all households; the key qualitative results would be unchanged if the consumption tax were used instead. As before, income tax rates are changed so that the rest of government budget is balanced throughout the transition path.
As shown in Run 5 in Table 10 , privatization with contribution matching increases national wealth, GNP and labor supply throughout the transition path compared to the prereform baseline economy. However, the long-run increases in national wealth, labor supply, and GNP are smaller relative to the case without contribution matching (Run 2 in Table 8) since the match must be financed with a distorting income tax. In the long run, GNP increases by only 5.9 percent, compared to 7.8 percent without the match.
The welfare gains for Run 5 reported in Table 11 show that contribution matching tends to improve the welfare of poorer households relative to Run 2 without the match. Whereas the poorest household born in the future gains $52,400 without the match, they gain $60,500
with the match. Not surprisingly, the richest households are worse off since they don't receive any of the match but must help finance it; they gained $84,300 without the match in the long run but only $65,700 with the match. With the LSRA, privatization still leads to efficiency losses, equal to about $4,400 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars) per future household. Yet, this loss is smaller than the $5,600 loss without the match.
Run 6 doubles the starting match rate from 10 percent at zero wage income to 20 percent.
As before, this match declines linearly to zero as labor income approaches $60,000. Table   11 shows that, with the LSRA, this more generous match produced efficiency losses equal to $9,900 per future household, which is larger in magnitude relative to the 10 percent match and even Run 2 without any match. This non-monotonic behavior is due to the trade-off between risk sharing and labor supply distortions: some match is beneficial but is dominated by distortions at higher tax rates. 27 In fact, there is no match rate that allows privatization to produced efficiency gains. Moreover, several alternative designs of contribution matching performed even worse. 28
Progressive Benefit Schedule. Run 7 takes a different approach to maintaining some progressivity after privatization. It immediately increases the progressivity of the Social Security benefit that remains after privatization by raising the replacement rate of the lowest wage income bracket from 90 percent to 120 percent while reducing the replacement rate of the highest wage income bracket from 15 percent to 10 percent. Run 8 is even more aggressive in redistribution by raising the replacement rate of the lowest wage income bracket to 150 percent. Table 11 shows that this approach is especially effective at protecting the welfare of the poor at the time of reform as well as reducing efficiency losses. Now, privatization reduces efficiency by only $100 per future household under the LSRA in Run 8. However, privatization actually increases efficiency by $2,700 per future household in Run 8. Increasing the progressivity of the smaller Social Security system that remains after privatization is more efficient than contribution matching because a considerable amount of redistribution can be accomplished with less distortion to labor supply, that is, with smaller effective tax rates at the margin. In particular, whereas contribution matching is based on the labor income in any given year, Social Security's progressive benefit is based on a household's lifetime earnings, which is harder to change. 27 These distortions arise from both the income tax used to finance the match as well as the effective marginal tax rates caused by the match itself. 28 For example, a proportional match for all households performed worse because, while eliminating implicit marginal tax rates in the phase-out range, enhanced the income tax distortions since more revenue is needed. We also considered financing the phased-out match with a negative match on those with above-average incomes. Although potentially more efficient at redistribution than an income tax, as the poor are not financing their own match, it also performed worse. Labor supply tends to be fairly elastic in our model whereas the savings elasticity is relatively low with precautionary saving. LSRA. This counter-intuitive result can be explained by the fact that a reduction in transitory shocks also increases the persistence of any shock. As a result, the effect of any negative shock becomes more permanent, potentially increasing the value of the risk sharing in the former Social Security system. 29 In the limit, the model collapses to one with no wage uncertainty if the transitory shocks are eliminated. In Run 10, the transitory shocks are reduced to one-fifth of their benchmark levels and in this case, privatization produces a smaller efficiency loss, compared to Run 9, equal to about $5,800 per future household. These two policy experiments show that changes in the amount of wage uncertainty have a non-monotonic impact on efficiency gains.
Alternative Assumptions of Transitory Shocks and Persistence

Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated whether a stylized Social Security privatization generates efficiency gains or losses in the presence of an overlapping-generations economy with elastic labor supply and idiosyncratic wage shocks and longevity uncertainty. We found that partial privatization of Social Security produces efficiency gains in a representative-agent economy 29 We benefited from a helpful conversation with Dirk Krueger on this point. without wage shocks (or, equivalently, if these shocks are insurable). In a heterogeneousagent economy with idiosyncratic and uninsurable wage shocks, however, the overall efficiency of the economy is reduced by our stylized privatization since the existing Social Security system provides a valuable source of risk sharing through its progressive benefit formula. This result was fairly robust to a wide range of model considerations: (i) the degree of openness of the economy; (ii) allowing the availability of actuarially-fair private annuities; (iii) the introduction of various risk-sharing mechanisms after privatization; and (iv)
reducing by half the size of transitory wage shocks. Only in the case in which the benefit replacement rate of the lowest bracket was increased to 150 percent from 90 percent did we find efficiency gains. Rather surprisingly, privatization performs relatively better in a closed economy where the rate of return falls as capital is accumulated and even when private annuity markets do not exist. Furthermore, matching the contribution of poorer workers can actually do more harm than good, whereas increasing the progressivity of the Social Security system that remains works well.
One of the possible limitations of our model is that it does not distinguish by various demographic groups, including race and gender. There is some evidence, for example, that black Americans do not live as long as non-blacks, even after controlling for differences in earnings. Blacks are also less likely to be married at the point of retirement and, therefore, less likely to qualify for a spousal benefit. 30 In contrast, women have a higher life expectancy than males, and they might also face a higher effective marginal tax rate on their contributions if they are the household's secondary earner. Incorporating these additional sources of heterogeneity would possibly change the welfare implications of this paper. Survival Rates of Households. The survival rates φ i at the end of age i = {20, ..., 109} are the weighted averages of males and females and calculated from the period life table (Table 4 .C6) in Social Security Administration (2001). The survival rates at the end of age 109 are replaced by zero. 32 To find the optimal end-of-period wealth, the model uses the Euler equation and bilinear interpolation (with respect to a and b) of marginal values at the beginning of the next period. 33 In a heterogeneous-agent economy, N e , N a , and N b are 8, 57, and 8, respectively. In a representative-agent economy, the numbers of grid points are 1, 61, and 6, respectively. 34
B.2 A Steady-State Equilibrium
The algorithm to compute a steady-state equilibrium is as follows. Let Ψ denote the timeinvariant government policy rule Ψ = (W LS , W G , C G , τ I (.), τ P (.), τ C , tr SS (ŝ i ), tr LS (ŝ i )). v(ŝ i , S t ; Ψ t ), are used in the marginal rate of substitution condition of consumption for leisure to obtain optimal working hours, and the values, v(ŝi, St; Ψt), are used to calculate welfare changes measured by compensating and equivalent variations in wealth. 34 The grid points on A and B are not equally spaced. In a heterogeneous-agent economy,Â ranges from -$271,000 to $33,825,000 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars) andB ranges from $8,000 to $80,400. In a representative-agent economy,Â andB range from -$333,000 to $1,573,000 and from $8,000 to $80,400, respectively. 35 If we find the capital-labor ratio, both r and w are calculated from the given production function and depreciation rate. In this paper, the endogenous policy variables are C G and ϕ SS in baseline economies, and τ C , ϕ I , trLS(ŝi), and WLS in policy experiments. 36 In the steady-state economy, the decision rule of a household d(ŝi; Ψ, Ω 0 ) is not a function of the aggregate state of economyŜ = (x(ŝi), WLS, WG). The measure of household x(ŝi) is determined uniquely by the steady-state condition, and the government's wealth W G is determined by the policy rule Ψ. 37 The marginal value with respect to historical earnings, ∂ ∂b v(ŝi; Ψ, Ω 0 ), is zero when i > 60 in this paper.
ii. Given a 0
